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Abstract 
Canada and Norway are similar in many ways. They share a strong commitment to 
international law and humanitarian issues, consistently rank amongst the most developed 
countries in the world, and have aligned themselves with the United States on security 
matters. They are also two of the five Arctic coastal states that have most actively engaged 
in northern issues over the last decade. Yet, on the issue of security in the Arctic, their 
interests have historically differed. This difference came to the fore during the governments 
of Stephen Harper (2006–2015) and Jens Stoltenberg (2005–2013). This article compares 
the divergent approaches to security and national defence in Canada and Norway under the 
Harper and Stoltenberg governments. It asks what role traditional military concerns in the 
circumpolar region had for the two countries during the period, and how threat perceptions 
in Ottawa and Oslo shaped their respective Arctic policies. We argue that, to understand the 
contrasting approaches to Arctic security, two factors are key: (1) the inherent difference in 
the two countries’ approach to, and utilisation of, NATO as a defence alliance; and (2) a 
clear difference in the role the Arctic holds for security considerations in the two countries 
given their disparate geographic locations. Ultimately, we make the case that to understand 
the different approaches adopted by Canada and Norway during the period examined, the 
Arctic needs to be understood not as one uniform region, but instead as a series of sub-
regions where the dominant security variable—Russia—is present to a greater or lesser 
degree.  












At first glance, Canada and Norway share many similarities, ranging from fairly small 
populations relative to their geographic size, to their reputations as bastions of untouched 
wilderness. These similarities extend to conceptions of their foreign and security policies. 
Historically, the two countries have actively worked to promote international cooperation on 
topics such as human rights, the role of the United Nations, and humanitarian issues more 
generally. The strong human rights dimension of Canadian foreign policy emerged in the wake of 
WWII. It remains central today in Canada’s political identity, and shares important parallels with 
the "policy of engagement" and internationalism found in Norwegian foreign policy.1 A clear 
expression of this is the Lysøen Declaration of 1998, in which the Foreign Ministers of both 
countries affirmed their common values, emphasised the promotion of human security,2 and 
agreed to work towards the implementation of the Ottawa Treaty on anti-personnel mines.  
Finally, both Canada and Norway have, over the past decade, highlighted their Arctic areas as a 
priority for both domestic and foreign policy purposes.3 
This is not to say that Canada and Norway share identical foreign and security policies. 
The Arctic, where the security interests of the two countries diverge, aptly illustrates this point. 
While there have always been differences between the two countries, these became particularly 
evident during Stephen Harper's Conservative government (2006–15) in Canada and the Red-
Green coalition government led by Jens Stoltenberg in Norway (2005–13). When Russia adopted 
a more self-assertive policy towards the region from 2006–7 onwards, Norway called for 
increased NATO engagement in the Arctic and the development of an explicit NATO Arctic 
policy.4 While not disputing NATO’s collective defence role in the north, Canada rejected both 
the possibility of a more active role for the security alliance in the region and the need for a 
specific Arctic policy.5 Why were Norwegian and Canadian security interests different in the 
                                                 
1 Arthur, Rise and Fall of a Middle Power; Haglund, “And the Beat Goes On: ‘Identity’ and Canadian Foreign 
Policy.” On Norway see Tamnes, Oljealder 1965-1995, Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie (Oil Age: Norwegian History 
of Foreign Policy). 
2 Human security was a concept that was promoted by both Canada and Norway in the early 1990s. It was meant to 
offer an alternative to the dominant, state-centric concept of security. 
3 Griffiths, “Towards a Canadian Arctic Strategy”; Hønneland and Rowe, Nordområdene - Hva Nå? (The High 
North - What Now?). 
4 Tamnes, “Arctic Security and Norway.”; Flikke, “Norway and the Arctic: Between Multilateral Governance and 
Geopolitics.”  
5 Interview with Former Canadian Diplomat, Global Affairs Canada,Vancouver, BC: January 9, 2017;, Interview 
with Government Official Canada II, Directorate of NATO Policy, Global Affairs Canada, Copenhagen, October 12, 
2016; Hilde, “Armed Forces and Security Challenges in the Arctic.”; Ivison, “Canada under Increasing Pressure to 
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Arctic? Did this reflect a shift in underlying security priorities in one (or both) of the two 
countries mentioned, or did it instead highlight fundamental differences in how the countries 
understand security in the Arctic?   
This article is based on a number of structured and semi-structured interviews with 
Canadian and Norwegian security officials working in both the Ministries of Defence and 
Foreign Affairs, as well as former diplomats dealing with this portfolio in 2006–2015.6 Drawing 
on these interviews and numerous published sources, we argue that the different approaches to 
the Arctic adopted by Norway and Canada during the period examined stemmed from two key 
factors: (1) the inherent difference in the two countries’ approach to and utilisation of NATO as a 
defence alliance; and (2) a clear difference in the role the Arctic holds for security considerations 
in the two countries. This leads us to argue that, more fundamentally, the Arctic needs to be 
understood as not one region, but a series of sub-regions where the dominant security variable is 
Russia. The assumption that the Arctic constitutes a single, coherent, and uniform region in terms 
of security interests – one region where the security interests of all the Arctic states are inherently 
intertwined – is often promoted by scholars and the media alike.7 Given the persistence of 
statements concerning the possibility of conflict in the north, we stress a more nuanced view of 
Arctic security.  
The literature on Arctic security issues encompasses a variety of definitions of “security.” 
While recognising the whole range of security studies and the interlinkages between the different 
types of security and safety, this article focuses on the traditional, state-centric concept of 
security – what is often referred to as military security.8 We begin with a brief discussion of the 
debate on security in the region and a historical overview of the key policy features of the 
Canadian and Norwegian governments during the early years of the new millennium.   
 
Security in the Arctic 
Some scholars point to the potential for armed struggle over resources or territory in the Arctic.9 
Others argue this is unlikely, although the regional relationships between Russia and other states 
in the region cannot be completely separated from the deterioration of the relationship between 
Russia and the West.10 At the same time, military activity in the Arctic is at a level not seen since 
the end of the Cold War.11 Most visibly, Russian bombers regularly fly along the North 
                                                                                                                                                              
Come up with Co-Ordinated NATO Response to Russia in Arctic.”; “Canadian PM and NATO S-G Discuss 
Afghanistan, the Strategic Concept, and the Arctic.” (WikiLeaks Cable). 
6 See the List of Interviews at the end of this article.  
7 For a range of approaches to this issue, see Young, “Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the 
Circumpolar North.”; Exner-Pirot, “What is the Arctic a Case of?The Arctic as a Regional Environmental Security 
Complex and the Implications for Policy.”; Padrtová, “The Arctic Regional Security Complex?”; Welch, “The Arctic 
and Geopolitics.”; Weber, “Security Fears Growing in the Arctic Region: Survey.” ; Greaves and Lackenbauer, “Re-
Thinking Sovereignty and Security in the Arctic.”; and Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security 
Implications of Global Warming.” 
8 Hoogensen Gjørv andGoloviznina, “Introduction: Can we Broaden our Understanding of Security in the Arctic?” 
9 Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown.” and “The Great Game Moves North.”; Huebert, “Submarines, Oil Tankers and 
Icebreakers.”  
10 Tamnes and Offerdal, “Conclusion.” In Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic; Keil, “The Arctic - A New Region 
of Conflict? The Case of Oil and Gas.”   
11 Expert Commission, “Unified Effort,” 17, 20. 
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Norwegian coast and across the North Pole. Russian military activity and investment in forces 
and infrastructure in the Arctic are often perceived as potentially threatening in other Arctic 
countries who are similarly discussing (re)investing in their northern capabilities.12 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has been implicitly present in the Arctic 
since its founding in 1949 through five of its member states (Canada, the United States, Norway, 
Iceland and Denmark). With the growth of the Soviet Northern Fleet based on the Kola 
Peninsula, particularly from the 1960s, both the European Arctic and the North Atlantic were 
envisioned as potential theatres of conflict with the USSR during the Cold War. The European 
Arctic thus gradually grew in importance in NATO strategic and operational planning.13 The 
defence alliance has, however, never had an explicit policy for the region dealing with both 
military and political issues. In the late 2000s, arguments concerning the “new” challenges facing 
the Arctic—like search and rescue, environmental protection, and general domain awareness—
were used to justify a larger NATO presence in the region.14 As Russian military activity in the 
north started to increase in 2007, Norway and Iceland also began arguing for the re-development 
of conventional military capabilities adapted for northern climates in order to shore up NATO’s 
credibility as a security provider.15 These approaches were counter-balanced on the one hand by 
the allies who considered the Arctic a distraction from more important issues, and on the other by 
those who argued that an active NATO engagement in the Arctic would harm relations with 
Russia and provoke unnecessary tension in the region.16 The ensuing debate was short-lived, 
however, as Canada firmly rebuffed the possibility of a larger role for NATO in the Arctic in 
2009.17 Ottawa argued that it did not see a role for the alliance in dealing with the “softer” 
security challenges facing the region.18 
Then, in 2014, tension between Russia and the West reached new heights with the 
annexation of Crimea and conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Sanctions were introduced by the United 
States, the European Union, and other countries such as Canada and Norway.19 The crisis also 
had an impact in the Arctic. Joint military exercises between NATO countries and Russia in the 
north—like Northern Eagle and Pomor—were cancelled or postponed indefinitely.20 At the same 
time, both Russia and NATO countries continued to conduct larger military exercises in the 
                                                 
12 Zysk, “Military Aspects of Russia’s Arctic Policy: Hard Power and Natural Resources.”; Danish Ministry of 
Defence, “Forsvarsministeriets fremtidige opgaveløsning i Arktis (Future Missions of the Danish Ministry of 
Defence in the Arctic).”; U.S. Coast Guard, “United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy.”; and Expert Commission, 
“Unified Effort.” 
13 Dyndal, “How the High North became Central in NATO Strategy.”  
14 Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer on security prospects in the High North, January 29, 
2009; Hilde and Widerberg, “NATOs nye strategiske konsept og Norge (NATO’s new strategic concept and 
Norway).”  
15 Hilde, “The ‘new’ Arctic - the Military Dimension.”  
16 Åtland, Security Implications of Climate Change in the Arctic. 
17 Interview with Government Official Canada, Defence and Security Relations Division, Global Affairs Canada, 
Oslo, February 5, 2015); Interview with Government Official Canada II, Directorate of NATO Policy, Global Affairs 
Canada, [insert date?]”; Haftendorn, “NATO and the Arctic: is the Atlantic alliance a Cold War relic in a peaceful 
region now faced with non-military challenges?” 
18 Byers, International Law and the Arctic; Hilde, “Armed Forces and Security Challenges in the Arctic.” 
19 European Union, “EU Sanctions against Russia over Ukraine Crisis.”  
20 Åtland, “North European Security after the Ukraine Conflict.”; Østhagen, “High North, Low Politics Maritime 
Cooperation with Russia in the Arctic.”  
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Arctic. The Ukraine crisis thus served to draw attention to the military security dimension in 
Arctic affairs.21 Attention shifted away from the “new” challenges that had proved divisive in 
NATO towards a traditional military security emphasis that was uncontroversial. Moreover, by 
2014, some of the factors that had spurred interest in the Arctic after the turn of the century had 
disappeared or waned. Notably, expectations regarding the profitability of Arctic petroleum 
resources had been curtailed by the shale gas revolution and subsequent fall in petroleum prices.  
Both the renewed emphasis on military security in the north since 2014 and a change in 
Canadian government have removed much of the basis for the Canadian-Norwegian 
disagreement over NATO’s role in the north. In 2017, the new Canadian government under Justin 
Trudeau released its new defence policy, “Strong, Secure, Engaged,” in which the Arctic was 
given a prominent role.22 The difference between the Norwegian and Canadian perceptions of 
Arctic security are thus less noticeable today than a few years ago. Yet, as we will highlight, they 
persist. The difference might have become less apparent within NATO, but is still relevant in the 
two countries’ security policies concerning the Arctic. We therefore ask: what are the underlying 
reasons for the Norwegian and Canadian approaches to Arctic security? To best answer this 
question, we first look at how Norway and Canada understand the Arctic.   
 
Canada and the Arctic 
It can be hard to pin down an exact definition of Canada’s Arctic. Generally defined as the three 
federal territories above the 60th parallel, the northern parts of some of the ten provinces also 
share important environmental and socio-economic similarities.23 Other definitions commonly 
used include the area above the treeline and Inuit Nunangat, the Inuit homeland which stretches 
from the border with Alaska in the West to the northern parts of Québec and Labrador in the East. 
This massive swathe of land encompasses 40 percent of Canada’s landmass and 25 percent of the 
global Arctic, yet it is home to only 110,000 people.  
A reoccurring theme in Canadian literature, the Arctic played an important role in nation 
building during the twentieth century. The idea of “the north” figures prominently in Canadian 
identity and is reflected in Québec with the notion of nordicité.24 Yet, the distance from Canadian 
urban centres—most of which are located close to the U.S. border—to the Canadian Arctic, is 
considerable in any context. Whereas Norway is relatively well integrated and unified across its 
Arctic and non-Arctic territory,25 Canada’s sheer vastness and harsh climate prompts a different 
reality with many communities accessible only by air, ice-road, or by sea during the ice-free 
months.  
Given this vast, sparsely populated, and often inaccessible region, it perhaps comes as no 
surprise that Canada’s primary Arctic security and foreign policy concerns revolve around issues 
of sovereignty. In the words of political scientist Rob Huebert: “[t]he core issue of Canadian 
Arctic sovereignty is control; the core issue of Canadian Arctic security is about responding to 
                                                 
21 Barnes, “U.S. Navy Begins Arctic Exercise Amid Stepped-up Criticism of Russia.”   
22 Government of Canada, “Strong, Secure, Engaged.”   
23 Government of Canada, “Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future.”  
24 Lackenbauer, “Polar Race or Polar Saga? Canada and the Circumpolar World.”   
25 Not including the Svalbard Archipelago. 
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threats.”26 And, even though relations with Canada’s two Arctic neighbours—Alaska in the West 
and Greenland in the East—are amicable, there are still two outstanding boundary disputes with 
both parties. For example, Denmark (on behalf of Greenland) and Canada disagree over the 
relatively insignificant Hans Island/Hans Ø.27 A second dispute, with the United States, is over 
the dividing line in the Beaufort Sea (where there is potential for oil and gas). Paralleling the 
former Norwegian-Russian dispute from 2010, Canada argues for a line derived from their 
understanding of the 1825 treaty between Russia and Britain, while the United States stands on 
the median principle.28 
Arguably the greatest threat to Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic is the disputed status of 
the Northwest Passage.29 Canada treats it as internal waters subject to Canadian jurisdiction, 
whereas the United States (and others) maintains that it is an international strait where foreign 
vessels, including military vessels, have the right to transit passage. The importance the Canadian 
government attaches to questions of sovereignty has led to some questionable policy decisions in 
the past, such as the forced relocation of Inuit families from northern Québec to the High Arctic 
Archipelago in the 1950s in order to “give evidence of ‘occupation’ as well as the presence of 
authority” that could be used to support Canada’s sovereignty claims.30 
Another incident occurred in 1985 when the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker, Polar Sea, 
transited the passage from Greenland to Alaska on a resupply mission without seeking permission 
from the Canadian government. While the Canadian government had been informed of the 
voyage, it severely underestimated the public outcry that was to ensue. The 1988 Agreement on 
Arctic Cooperation was drafted in response and “pledges that all navigation by U.S. icebreakers 
within waters claimed by Canada to be internal will be undertaken with the consent of the 
Government of Canada.”31 This represented, in the words of then-Prime Minister Brian 
Mulroney, “a practical solution that is consistent with the requirements of Canadian sovereignty 
in the Arctic.”32 Taken together, these Arctic disputes have contributed to what has been called 
“sovereignty anxiety”: the perception that Canada is struggling to uphold its sovereignty in the 
Arctic and is thus prone to security threats in the region.33  
More recently, these issues came to the fore under the Conservative government that was 
in power from 2006 to 2015. Prime Minister Harper made Arctic security an important 
component of his campaign and emphasised upholding Canada’s sovereignty.34 Throughout his 
years in office, the Prime Minister made Arctic security and Canada’s sovereignty central 
elements of his party’s brand: the Prime Minister made yearly visits during Operation Nanook, a 
“sovereignty operation exercise” initiated in 2007; funded and heavily publicised efforts to find 
                                                 
26 Huebert, “Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security in a Transforming Circumpolar World,”  19–20. 
27 Byers, International Law and the Arctic. 
28 Sharp, “An Old Problem, a New Opportunity: A Case for Solving the Beaufort Sea Boundary Dispute.”   
29 Griffiths, “Arctic Security: The Indirect Approach.”  
30 Shadian, “In Search of an Identity Canada Looks North.”  
31 “Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on Arctic 
Cooperation.” (1988).  
32 “Canada—United States: Agreement on Arctic Cooperation and Exchange of Notes Concerning Transit of 
Northwest Passage.” 
33 Lackenbauer, “Polar Race or Polar Saga? Canada and the Circumpolar World.” 
34 MacAskill, “Canada Uses Military Might in Arctic Scramble.”   
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Sir John Franklin’s ill-fated Arctic expedition; and ordered Canadian scientists to revise their 
submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to include the North Pole.35 
During Harper’s time in office, potential threats to Canada’s Arctic were highlighted. In 
particular, Russian bombers and fighter jets flying close to Canadian Arctic airspace were used as 
an example of an imminent threat to Canadian sovereignty in the north.36 These flights had 
become infrequent following the Cold War, but became more common after 2007.  In response, 
the Conservative government increased the defence budget and initiated procurement projects, 
including stealth snowmobiles, Arctic drones, and controversial Arctic offshore patrol vessels.37 
This continued through the financial crisis in 2008, which affected Canada (like Norway), but 
overall left it relatively unscathed. The subsequent drop in oil prices compounded the financial 
strain on the government, however, and several of the Arctic projects were put on hold or scaled 
back.38 This backpedalling on Arctic investment led some to label Harper’s approach as “all talk, 
no action.”39  
Others have debated the credibility of the threat posed by the Russian aircraft flying close 
to Canadian Arctic airspace. A comparative study of Russian flight behaviour found that those 
aircraft flying near the North American Arctic did not violate Canadian airspace; that the number 
of interceptions in the North American Arctic was quite small relative to the Baltics, the Sea of 
Japan, or the North Atlantic; and that the behaviour displayed by Russian planes was less 
aggressive in the Arctic.40 Furthermore, as the Kremlin has an identical legal position concerning 
its Northern Sea Route, it has been careful not to compromise Canada’s sovereignty—at least 
insofar as it could set a legal precedent that would affect them.41 Many have argued that a more 
pressing concern in the north is the persistent social and economic problems—ranging from food 
security to vulnerability to a changing climate—facing Canada’s northern communities.42 And 
although Harper’s approach to the Arctic softened towards the end of his premiership, the 
government’s rhetoric and actions towards Moscow—including sanctions targeting Russia’s 
northern oil and gas development—remained sharp after the Ukraine conflict in 2014.  
Even the threats posed by the outstanding boundary disputes and the status of the 
Northwest Passage are relatively minor when considered in the context of the wider relationship 
between Canada and its neighbours. With regard to the United States, for example, the two 
countries have agreed to disagree on the legal status of the Northwest Passage while still 
                                                 
35 Byers, “The North Pole is a Distraction.”  
36 CBC News, “Canadian Fighter Jets Intercept Russian Bombers in Arctic.”;  Lackenbauer, “Mirror Images? 
Canada, Russia, and the Circumpolar World.”; Wallin and Dallaire, Sovereignty and Security in Canada’s Arctic.,”  
37 Byers, “Why Canada’s Search for an Icebreaker is an Arctic Embarrassment.”  
38 Cox and Speer, “From a Mandate for Change to a Plan to Govern: A New National Defence Policy For A 
Dangerous World,” 4. 
39 Byers, “Why Canada’s Search for an Icebreaker is an Arctic Embarrassment.” 
40 Lasserre and Têtu, “Russian Air Patrols in the Arctic: are Long-Range Bomber Patrols a Challenge to Canadian 
Security and Sovereignty?”  
41 During the 1985 incident with the USCG Polar Sea, for example, the USSR came out in support of Canada’s 
position diplomatically. See Howson. “The Canadian-American Dispute over the Arctic’s Northwest Passage.”  
42 Perreault, “The Arctic Linked to the Emerging Dominant Ideas in Canada’s Foreign and Defence Policy.”; Furgal 
and Seguin, “Climate Change, Health, and Vulnerability in Canadian Northern Aboriginal Communities.” ; Power, 
“Conceptualizing Food Security for Aboriginal People in Canada.” . 
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cooperating behind closed doors and upholding national interests publicly.43 In terms of actual 
military cooperation, the two countries maintain close ties, with the Canadian military placing a 
high importance on interoperability with American forces. Elsewhere, the North American 
Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), established in 1957 to provide joint surveillance of 
potential air space threats in North America, is a testament to the close security relationship 
between the two countries. Over time, NORAD has become one of the foundations of defence 
collaboration between the United States and Canada, with the surveillance of the maritime 
domain added in 2006.44 However, these arrangements are what Jockel and Sokolsky deem 
“remarkably informal” when framed in the broader context of North Atlantic security.45  
In sum, Canada’s approach to the Arctic during the Conservative government from 2006 
to 2015 was Janus-faced. The Harper government’s strong rhetoric stood at odds with the 
apparent lack of credible military security threats faced in the Canadian Arctic. Had the threats 
been more pressing, it is unlikely that the proposed investments in Arctic security would have 
been scaled back as significantly as they were, or that Ottawa would have resisted a role for 
NATO in the Arctic so adamantly. As Whitney Lackenbauer elegantly surmises: “Anxiety about 
‘using or losing’ our Arctic inheritance is more revealing of the Canadian psyche […] than of 
objective realities.”46 Instead, the challenges Canada faces in the Arctic are largely socio-
economic and environmental. As political disputes are with close allies, there is limited risk that 
they will escalate into any form of military conflict.  
 
Norway and the High North 
The Norwegian definition of the Arctic is everything north of the Arctic Circle (66°34N). , 
Norway’s foreign policy generally distinguishes between the Arctic (referring essentially to the 
Arctic Ocean and the largely uninhabited territories in the High Arctic) and the more hospitable 
and populated parts of northern Norway and Svalbard, as well as the adjacent maritime and land 
areas in the European part of the Arctic. The latter are referred to as the ‘High North’.47 Sparsely 
populated by European standards, the population of almost half a million in Norway alone is 
relatively high as compared to the North American Arctic. As one third of Norway’s territory and 
80 percent of its maritime exclusive economic zone are found within the region, the Arctic is not 
isolated from larger national security and defence policies. Instead, the High North is central to 
security considerations in Norway.  
While previous scholarship has examined the possibility of conflict over the Arctic’s 
resources,48 the main consideration for Norway is its shared land and sea border with Russia.49 
Since the end of World War II, Norwegian security policy has concentrated on managing its 
                                                 
43 Griffiths, “Arctic Security: The Indirect Approach,” 10–11; Griffiths, “Towards a Canadian Arctic Strategy.” 
44 Jockel and Sokolsky, “Continental Defence: ‘Like Farmers Whose Lands Have a Common Concession Line’.”  
45 Jockel and Sokolsky, “Canada and NATO: Keeping Ottawa In, Expenses Down, Criticism Out... and the Country 
Secure.”  
46 Lackenbauer, “From Polar Race to Polar Saga,”  73. 
47 Støre, “The High North and the Arctic: The Norwegian Perspective.” 
48 For some excellent overviews of this debate, see Keil, “The Arctic - A New Region of Conflict? The Case of Oil 
and Gas.”; and Grindheim, The Scramble for the Arctic? A Discourse Analysis of Norway and the EU’s Strategies 
Towards the European Arctic. 
49 Tamnes, Oljealder 1965-1995: Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie (Oil Age: Norwegian History of Foreign Policy). 
9 
 
relationship with its eastern neighbour. In what is generally termed an asymmetric relationship, 
Norway has endeavoured to balance its military inferiority to Russia through membership of 
NATO and a bilateral relationship with the United States.50 At the same time, Norway has been a 
strong supporter of multilateralism and cooperative solutions in its foreign policy.51 This has 
created a situation where, on the one hand, Norway has sought an active presence and 
engagement from the United States and its European allies, with the aim of deterring Russia. On 
the other hand, Norway has pursued multilateral cooperation with Russia in both international 
and regional organisations, ranging from the UN to the Arctic Council to regional cooperation in 
the Barents area. 
The “Red-Green” Coalition government led by Jens Stoltenberg, consisting of the Labour 
party (red), the Socialist Left party (red/green), and the Centre party (agrarian green), took office 
in the autumn of 2005, and placed a strong emphasis on Arctic affairs. The Foreign Minister, 
Jonas Gahr Støre, led the government’s High North drive.52 The Arctic moved to the forefront of 
Norwegian policy through a series of studies and parliamentary reports in 2003–2005 that 
highlighted the economic potential of the region.53 This renewed interest was spurred particularly 
by economic interests in the Barents Sea from the petroleum sector, as fields further south in the 
North Sea are becoming depleted. The new government’s focus on the High North was also 
catalysed by events relating to Russia. Just as the new government took office, a crisis erupted 
with the failed arrest of the Russian trawler Elektron, highlighting both the significance and 
challenges of cooperation with Russia in the Barents Sea.54  
During the Stoltenberg government, the elevation of the High North was part of a 
deliberate focus on circumpolar cooperation by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry that was 
designed to counterbalance the bellicose statements concerning the conflict potential in the 
north.55 In both foreign and domestic media, Foreign Minister Støre, as well as Prime Minister 
Stoltenberg, frequently stressed the region’s uniqueness as an area for cooperation.56 Notably, in 
2007, as the Russian scientist and parliamentarian Artur Chilingarov planted a flag on the North 
Pole seabed and helped draw worldwide attention to the region, Støre used the opportunity to 
emphasise multilateral cooperation.57  
                                                 
50 Tamnes, “Arctic Security and Norway”; Tamnes, Oljealder 1965-1995 (Oil Age). 
51 Neumann et al., “Norge og alliansene: Gamle tradisjoner, nytt spillerom (Norway and the Alliances: Old 
Traditions, New Room for Manoeuvre).”  
52 Jensen and Hønneland, “Framing the High North: Public Discourses in Norway after 2000.” 
53 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “St.meld. Nr. 30 (2004–2005): Muligheter og utfordringer i nord (No. 30 
(2004-2005) to the Storting: Opportunities and Challenges in the North)”; Orheim et al., NOU 2003:32 Mot Nord! 
Utfordringer og muligheter i Nordområdene (Official Norwegian Report: Towards the North! Challenges and 
Opportunities in the High North); Brunstad et al., Big Oil Playground, Russian Bear Preserve Or European 
Periphery?; ECON. “2025 Ringer i vannet (2025 Circles in the Water).”   
54 See Bigg, “Russia: Trawler Escapes Norwegian Coast Guard While Still Carrying Inspectors.” 
55 Jensen and Hønneland, “Framing the High North: Public Discourses in Norway after 2000”; Grindheim, “The 
Scramble for the Arctic? A Discourse Analysis of Norway and the EU’s Strategies Towards the European Arctic.” 
56 Støre, “Arctic State”; Moe, Fjærtoft, and Øverland, “Space and Timing: Why Was the Barents Sea Delimitation 
Dispute Resolved in 2010?”; Støre, “The High North and the Arctic: The Norwegian Perspective.” 
57 Grindheim, “The Scramble for the Arctic? A Discourse Analysis of Norway and the EU’s Strategies Towards the 
European Arctic,” 6–10. 
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The renewed emphasis on the Arctic also stressed the need to build a pragmatic bilateral 
relationship with Russia in order to manage cross-border issues, ranging from migration and trade 
to fish stocks, and to improve people-to-people cooperation on local and regional levels.58 At the 
same time, in line with its traditional approach, Norway sought to avoid excessive bilateralisation 
through the use of multinational fora and organisations.  
A highlight of this cooperative Arctic focus came in 2010, when Norway and Russia 
agreed to settle their boundary dispute in the Arctic. After four decades of negotiation, both sides 
agreed to delineate a maritime border in the Barents Sea. Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov and 
his Norwegian counterpart Støre subsequently co-authored an op-ed in the Canadian newspaper 
Globe and Mail, in which they asked Canada to take note: “if there is one lesson that the biting 
cold and the dark winters of the Arctic should teach us, it is that no one survives alone out there 
for long.”59 
Yet, this message could be considered equally applicable to Norway’s efforts to keep its 
allies engaged in northern affairs. Emphasis on cooperation with Russia did not diminish the 
overarching security concerns related to Russia. These concerns never entirely disappeared, but 
were seen as less pressing in the early to mid 2000s. Prior to 2005, and to a large degree from 
2005 to 2007, traditional security aspects were almost absent from High North policy.60  
While cooperation continued to be highlighted in Norwegian foreign policy in general and 
the High North policy, the years 2007 and 2008 witnessed a clear shift in Norwegian security and 
defence policy, and therefore to some extent in its High North policy. From 2007 to 2014, 
security “enhanced” High North policy in the sense that concerns about Russia were framed as 
“the changing security environment in the Arctic/High North.”61 Thus, while continuing to 
emphasise the need for good neighbourly relations with Russia, the Stoltenberg government also 
made the decision to modernise the Norwegian military: new submarines were added to the fleet 
and ageing F-16s were replaced with F-35s.62 Both decisions were clearly motivated by the 
potential for military challenge from Russia in the North. As we shall return to below, from 2008 
securing NATO’s and key allies’ attention to Norwegian concerns in the North similarly became 
the core effort of Norwegian security policy. Russia was plainly the reason for these concerns, 
but Norwegian authorities rarely stated this explicitly, even in closed-door NATO settings. Only 
after the change of government in 2013, and Ukraine crisis in 2014, did the Norwegian 
authorities start to refer openly to Russia as a potential threat to be deterred.63  
Under the new “blue-blue” coalition government from 2013, a recalibration of Arctic 
expectations occurred.64 The drop in the price of oil and natural gas, combined with the dramatic 
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events in Ukraine in spring 2014, were key reasons. From 2014, as NATO gradually returned to 
emphasising collective defence at home, Norwegian security and defence policy became more 
detached from High North policy, as it shifted towards more traditional Cold War issues and 
geography.65 Instead of promoting NATO engagement in the Arctic, Norway placed new  
emphasis on maritime issues and the North Atlantic in particular.66 As a result, Norwegian High 
North policy—as a specific portfolio under the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs—is today 
both low key and (almost) exclusively concerned with soft security issues. Norway’s relationship 
to the Arctic at large, however, is inherently intertwined with its relationship with Russia and, for 
the foreseeable future, will be determined to a large extent by Russian actions and development.67 
 
Explaining Differing Approaches 
Despite the overlap in security priorities elsewhere in the world, the period from 2005 to 2015 
revealed differing approaches by the governments of Norway and Canada to the security policies 
of their own northern areas. For each country, the Arctic embodies different conceptions of 
security. Norway—under the Stoltenberg government and Foreign Minister Støre—placed weight 
on cooperation with Russia and rhetorically downplayed security concerns, even as concerns over 
Russian military activity were growing. Norway’s approach had firm roots in history: it 
represented a balancing act in line with traditional Norwegian foreign policy in that it stressed 
good neighbourly relations, while at the same time emphasising deterrence, by drawing NATO 
and the United States close and through investment in national defence. In Canada, Stephen 
Harper’s Conservative government deployed bellicose rhetoric to paint Russia as an immediate 
concern in order to gain favour domestically, even as there were some in Canada who questioned 
the credibility of a Russian threat. Compared to Norway, however, Canadian defence investment 
directed towards meeting challenges in the Arctic remained limited.  
To understand these contrasting approaches to Arctic security, we put forward two 
arguments relating to: (1) the inherent difference in the two countries’ approaches to, and 
utilisation of, NATO as a defence alliance; and (2) a clear difference in the Arctic’s role in 
security considerations in the two countries, given their different geographic locations.  
 
NATO’s role in Norwegian and Canadian defence  
The role of NATO varies greatly between the two countries. While both Norway and Canada are 
founding members of NATO, their engagement with, and understanding of, the alliance have 
shifted over time. This has been particularly true with regard to Canada. During the 1960s and 
1970s, Canada’s commitment to the alliance waxed and waned. Canada had worked to develop 
NATO into a value-based transatlantic community—evident most notably in the Canadian 
insistence on including Article 2 in the North Atlantic Treaty, commonly referred to as “the 
Canadian article.”68 Establishing cooperation with the United States through NORAD in 1957, 
however, served to strengthen the understanding of NATO as a Europe-centred alliance that was 
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of marginal relevance to Canada’s security.69 The election of Pierre Trudeau in 1968 brought a 
shift in defence considerations. Building on the public scepticism that had quietly grown during 
the 1960s, as well as the general perception that NATO was an alliance dominated by the United 
States for the defence of Europe, Prime Minister Trudeau contemplated leaving the alliance 
altogether. Instead, however, a major review of foreign policy in 1969 saw Canada’s military 
contributions to the alliance in Europe cut drastically.70 In part to waylay some of the concerns 
expressed by NATO allies about this reduction in forces, Ottawa pledged to deploy the Canadian 
Air-Sea Transportable Brigade (CAST) to Norway in the event of war.71 Although an important 
symbol of solidarity,72 the first deployment of CAST—roughly two decades later, in 1986—was 
beset by problems, in particular surrounding the pre-placement of military equipment in Norway. 
Despite a visit from the Norwegian Defence Minister, who reportedly argued for the continuation 
of CAST, the commitment was abandoned.73  
The end of the Cold War led to a renewed Canadian commitment to NATO, but also to a 
new debate on burdensharing and Canadian interests.74 The “new NATO” placed greater 
emphasis on values and commitment, something Canada had traditionally promoted. Canada 
became one of the largest contributors to NATO operations in the Western Balkans—in line with 
the wider trend in Canadian (and Norwegian) foreign policy towards the turn of the century of 
replacing participation in UN-led missions with NATO operations.75 In Afghanistan, the volatile 
southern province of Kandahar was the main area of focus for Canada’s contribution from 2006. 
Canada lost 158 soldiers, and the unwillingness of European allies to share the burden in the 
south of Afghanistan provoked irritation in Ottawa and questions in Canada about the value of 
NATO.76 Due to domestic political considerations, Norway was among the NATO members 
which refused to contribute troops to support the Canadian effort in Kandahar.77  
While the Harper government decided to end the country’s combat role in Afghanistan in 
2011, Canada became a major contributor to the NATO air operations over Libya in the same 
year. Canada’s involvement in the assurance measures in the Baltic States and Poland, adopted at 
the Wales summit in 2014, further fits the picture of a committed ally that provides support where 
needed. Canada did, however, decide to withdraw from NATO’s Airborne Warning and Control 
System (AWACS) program, as well as from the procurement program for NATO drones.78 These 
decisions must be seen within the context of the shrinking defence budget; while certain projects 
received additional funding, overall defence spending fell to 1 percent of GDP in 2015.79 
Nonetheless, these decisions do suggest a Canadian reluctance to invest in NATO. 
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In comparison with Canada, the Norwegian approach to NATO was more straightforward 
and single-minded during the Cold War. As noted above, Norway sought to balance neighbourly 
relations with the Soviet Union through deterrence in the shape of NATO and the United States. 
Given the Norwegian policy of restraint, evidenced by its refusal to allow the stationing of allied 
combat troops in Norway during peacetime, Norway has traditionally sought to enhance the 
credibility (and visibility) of the deterrence through, among other means, the presence of NATO 
and allied forces in joint military exercises. Norway also sought commitments from allies that 
they would reinforce Norway in times of crisis. The CAST Brigade was one such commitment.80 
From 2007, in its effort to raise awareness of Arctic affairs within NATO, Norway tried to 
frame developments in the Arctic under the banners of “new” or “soft” security challenges, but 
the real security concern from a Norwegian perspective was Russia.81 Partly to avoid securitising 
the Arctic by depicting Russia as a potential threat, then Foreign Minister Støre instead sought to 
outline challenges that derived from increased commercial activity and presence in the Arctic.82 
This led to confusion among Norway’s allies, as Norway seemed to be arguing for an increased 
NATO role in the north due to an increase in non-traditional security challenges, while also 
emphasising traditional concerns over Russian resurgence.83 This was partially rectified in 2008, 
when Norway launched the “Core Area Initiative.” Aimed at getting NATO back to basics by re-
emphasising close-to-home, traditional security concerns in areas such as the Arctic, the Baltic 
Sea and the Mediterranean, the initiative was directed mainly at strengthening the NATO 
Command Structure – a traditional priority for Norway in NATO.84  
Canada, however, distanced itself from Norway’s position, and from 2009 blocked any 
text on the Arctic in NATO documents and any NATO Arctic initiatives.85 Norway’s seeming 
emphasis on the need for NATO to perform civilian tasks in the Arctic did not correspond with 
Canadian interests in the alliance. It also did not speak to any direct military threat in the 
Canadian Arctic. If anything, the view in Ottawa was that Canada needed to invest in its own 
Arctic capabilities in anticipation of a more commercially active region.86 Moreover, the 
potential intrusion of NATO into the Arctic played into Canada’s sovereignty anxiety: by 
introducing a larger player in the north, it both undermined Ottawa’s position of (relative) 
strength,87 and added the possibility that the carefully crafted compromise with the United States 
on the legal status of the Northwest Passage might unravel.88  
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Whereas Norway’s primary emphasis in NATO has always been on the collective defence 
of its territory, Canada’s approach emphasises using the alliance to gain political capital (in 
particular with the United States). While political capital is also important for Norway, 
Norwegian governments see participation in operations as an investment in Norwegian security. 
For Canada, other political goals are considered salient. Participation for Canada, in other words, 
is more about foreign policy than security policy. Canada’s comparatively large contribution in 
Afghanistan, for example, was designed, among other things, to curry favour with the United 
States.89 From the Canadian perspective, NATO thus had little contemporary relevance to the 
challenges of the Canadian North beyond the collective defence role the alliance has always 
played.  
Consequently, NATO serves different functions for the two countries in question. Canada 
does not need NATO in the Arctic to manage Russia, whereas Norway does. Where Norway sees 
NATO as its formalised defence guarantee, Canada has its own bilateral defence guarantees 
through NORAD and integration with USNORTHCOM (United States Northern Command).90  
 
Two very different Arctics 
For both Norway and Canada, Russia is a key factor in Arctic security considerations—even if it 
is more rhetorical than real in the case of the latter. The argument is often made that melting 
Arctic sea ice is opening up the region. The geography of the Arctic is changing, and previously 
frozen security concerns are increasingly becoming relevant.91 This is an oversimplified portrayal 
of the Arctic and a misunderstanding of the fundamental role of geography in the north. As 
Norway and Canada illustrate, the geographic context matters.  
The shared land and maritime border with Russia has dominated, and will continue to 
dominate, the security concerns of Norway. Performing a balancing act between neighbourly 
relations and maintaining a credible deterrence and defence of its own territory is the main task at 
hand. Norway’s security concerns and neighbourly relations, however, do not reach across the 
Atlantic or the Arctic to Canada. Compared with Norway, Russia does not pose the same security 
concerns for Canada. Canada’s airspace is occasionally “buzzed” by Russian jets, and concerns 
remain over “adversarial” cruise and ballistic missiles (and the concurrent need to modernise 
warning systems in the North).92 By comparison, however, the Russian Northern Fleet—Russia’s 
core military asset in the Arctic—is located on Norway’s doorstep.  
While Canada’s expansive geography in the Arctic creates socio-economic, 
environmental, and political challenges, it also provides a natural security buffer that mitigates 
potential security threats from the north. Any threatening land force would have to cross multiple 
geographical barriers just to reach the Canadian Arctic’s northern shores, which, it could be 
argued, hold very little strategic value. As Canadian Chief of Defence General Walter Natyncyk 
quipped in 2009: “[i]f someone were to invade the Canadian Arctic, my first task would be to 
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rescue them.”93 This stands in stark contrast to Norwegian security concerns. The European 
Arctic is the core arena for Norwegian defence activity and security interests. Norway also sees 
itself as “responsible” within the NATO alliance for the northern flank of the North Atlantic, 
meaning the Barents Sea and thus the European Arctic.94  
Instead of understanding the Arctic as one security region, it is necessary to recognise it 
as many different regions in which the real or perceived threat posed by Russia—and the policy 
considerations that threat evokes—varies. The significance of geography is undervalued when the 
Arctic is depicted as one uniform security region.95 Despite the melting sea ice, the Arctic 
remains vast. Regardless of globalisation and the notion of an end of boundaries, geography and 
physical space still come into play, at least with regard to traditional security concerns for 
Norway and Canada. 
This was further evidenced by the two countries’ reactions to Russian actions in Ukraine 
in 2014. If anything, Norway and Canada disagreed over how to relate to Russia in the Arctic 
after Moscow annexed Crimea. Norway, preferring a balanced approach, called for continued 
cooperation in Arctic-specific forums, while at the same time strengthening deterrence in the 
north.96 Under Stephen Harper, the Canadian Government was outspoken in its criticism of 
Russia and did not see the Arctic as a separate issue. Instead, the Arctic became one of the few 
arenas in which Canada could attempt to punish Russia for its actions.97  
 
Conclusion 
The lack of a coherent NATO policy for the Arctic exemplifies a crucial but often overlooked 
point: that the Arctic should not be understood as a single region – at least in terms of national 
security interests. Canada and Norway have divergent views on security in the Arctic, as their 
perceptions are informed by different realities and needs. Whereas NATO is integral to the 
Norwegian Arctic security context, it is less immediate and relevant for Canada. Canada’s 
security concerns in its northern territories are less state-centric and military-oriented than those 
of Norway, a reflection of the relative lack of credible state threats in the region. Thus, while the 
Norwegian emphasis on non-military concerns resonates with Canada on some levels, Ottawa 
does not see a role for NATO in handling such challenges. Moreover, and unlike the Norwegian 
case, defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Canada is less a matter for NATO than 
for the bilateral relationship between Canada and the United States. Norway and Canada share 
many priorities on the international stage, but this is not true of the Arctic. Their contrasting 
approaches are the result of differing understandings of what poses a threat in the Arctic and the 
best way to manage these threats—both of which are informed by their dramatically different 
geographic contexts. While it might be tempting to treat the Arctic as one uniform security 
region, in reality this obscures more than it illuminates.   
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